Enterprises with a monopoly on large energy storage technology

Do monopoly enterprises maintain their monopolies in China's energy industry?

When the monopoly power in the early stage leads to the increase in TFP and the decrease in rent-seeking probability during the later stage, it shows that the monopoly enterprises in China’s energy industry are inclined to maintain their monopoly position through the technological progress in the later stage.

What are the data of monopoly enterprises in the energy industry?

The data of the monopoly enterprises in the energy industry after the aforementioned treatment are as follows. The original data sample observation value is 22,430. After deleting 817 error observations, the remaining effective observation value is 21,559, accounting for 96.1% of the total sample observation value.

How can the government improve monopoly enterprises in the energy industry?

On the basis of sustained economic development, the government should fully reflect the restraint of and attack on the rent-seeking behavior of enterprises. Second, private capital should become an important source of power to improve the management and governance ability of monopoly enterprises in the energy industry.

What are the monopoly modes of Chinese Energy Enterprises?

Monopoly modes of Chinese energy enterprises are analyzed. Monopoly power, rent-seeking and TFP are all measured. R&D is important channel for monopoly to promote TFP. Factor distortion is channel for monopoly to increase rent-seeking and inhibit TFP. Monopoly power maintenance in the China’s energy sector mainly depends on rent-seeking.

Does monopoly power increase rent-seeking probability in China's energy industry?

When the monopoly power in the early stage causes the increase in the rent-seeking probability and the decrease in TFP during the later stage, it indicates that the monopoly enterprises in China’s energy industry are inclined to maintain the monopoly power they have obtained through the rent-seeking behavior.

Do monopoly enterprises rely on rent-seeking behavior?

The results are as follows. First, China’s monopoly enterprises in the energy industry generally involve rent-seeking monopoly. Such enterprises rely on rent-seeking behavior to maintain their monopoly power. The existence of rent-seeking behavior results in non-productive expenditure on production factors of energy enterprises.